ED MORRISSEY: Dire Strait: Sure Looks Like China Is Writing Off the Ayatollahs.
[Foreign Affairs’ Yun] Sun writes, Beijing has belatedly realized how poorly Iran performs, both economically and in terms of real power projection. Only when the West appeases Iran does the regime appear strong. When the West confronts Iran, everything withers, including their will to fight. Sun writes that Trump isn’t the only one looking forward to a potential regime change:
Although Chinese state media have refrained from openly criticizing the regime, the Chinese policy community focused on the Middle East is clear-eyed about the bad decision-making, rampant corruption and poor governance in Tehran. Israel’s ability to infiltrate the Iranian security apparatus, which is what allowed it to effectively target Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists during the 12-day war, suggests that many Iranian officials don’t trust their system and are willing to sell out their country. Chinese leaders are skeptical of the viability of an Iranian state that its own officials don’t have faith in.
China’s disillusionment with Iran’s leaders means that Beijing is not inherently opposed to regime change. Because its priority is to ensure that Iran remains a viable economic partner, it is regime agnostic. In fact, if the U.S. and Israeli attacks curtail Iran’s rogue military ambitions and the country repositions itself as an economic power in the Middle East, it could represent a future that China embraces.
China also has a meeting with Trump at the end of March. Xi wants to find a rapprochement with Trump on trade as well as global security concerns. Iran could have been leverage in those talks before the war broke out, but now it will be either a liability or potentially a deal-breaker.
Why, it’s as if: Trump’s ultimate target in this war is China. Geoffrey Cain of the Spectator notes that, “at the end of this month, Xi must sit across from Donald Trump, the man who greenlit the strike on the Ayatollah in Tehran and the seizure of Maduro in Caracas:”
Xi arrives boxed in on every front. He cannot defend Iran without alienating the Gulf states. He cannot abandon Iran without appearing weak to the remaining members of the coalition he spent a decade assembling. He needs a trade deal to stabilize China’s economy, which is slowing far faster than Beijing admits. Official figures claim 5 percent growth, but Rhodium Group, a widely cited independent research firm, puts the real number at closer to 2.5 to 3 percent. He needs Trump in a generous mood.
The deepest damage, though, is something Xi cannot afford to acknowledge: what losing Iran means for Taiwan.
Most analysts think about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in military terms. Can Beijing’s forces actually land there and take the island? But invading Taiwan would also trigger western sanctions far worse than any-thing imposed on Russia. And after what happened to Khamenei, Beijing knows that escalation does not end with sanctions. To survive all that, China needs countries willing to sell it oil off the books, help it move money past western banks and provide political cover. Iran and Russia were supposed to be those countries.
China could still invade Taiwan, but not with any confidence that the CCP would survive the consequences. Some will argue that makes Xi more dangerous, that a leader who sees his options shrinking might act before they disappear. But everything he is doing points the other way. He is shoring up his economy, not preparing for war.
The summit will be conducted in the language of trade. Iran will hang over every session, but don’t expect that in the communiqué. Every government from Tokyo to Riyadh will read the subtext.
Xi will sit across from Trump and speak the language of a strong and ascendant China. The image is no longer the reality.
It doesn’t help Xi that the war in Iran isn’t serving as a convincing infomercial for the CCP’s weapons systems: China Sold Iran Fancy CM-302 Missiles—Turns Out They’re Temu Trash: 100% Failure Rate in Real War
